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PUNISHING BAD BROKERS:  
SELF-REGULATION AND FINRA SANCTIONS 
Barbara Black* 
INTRODUCTION 
Regulation of the broker-dealer industry by a self-regulatory 
organization (SRO)1 is an integral part of the federal regulatory scheme 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). As a result, 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the sole SRO for 
U.S. broker-dealers,2 plays an important role in protecting investors, 
especially retail investors, and bolstering investor confidence in the 
securities industry and capital markets.3 Suppose a retail investor believes 
that the sales representative of the brokerage firm with whom she has an 
account4 (colloquially, her “broker”) has abused her trust and caused her 
financial loss. The investor likely wants to recover her losses and to see the 
broker punished. FINRA, and not the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the SEC), is the regulator that primarily addresses her 
concerns, the first through its arbitration forum5 and the second through its 
disciplinary proceedings. FINRA is the “cop on the beat.” In 2012 FINRA 
brought approximately 1500 disciplinary actions against broker-dealer firms 
and associated persons, imposed fines of more than $68 million, and 
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 1. “Self-regulatory organization” is a defined term in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act), Pub. L. No. 94-29, sec. 3(6), § 3(a)(26), 89 Stat. 97, 100 (1975) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2012)), and includes a national securities association 
registered under 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA), 
previously known as the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the NASD), is the only 
national securities association. 
 2. In 2007, the member firm regulation and enforcement functions of the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASD were consolidated, and the NASD changed its name to FINRA. The 
consolidation was intended to “streamline the broker-dealer regulatory system, combine 
technologies, and permit the establishment of a single set of rules and [a single set of] examiners 
with complementary areas of expertise [within] a single [SRO].” Self-Regulatory Organizations, 
Exchange Act Release No. 55,495, 2007 WL 1260858, at *9 (Mar. 20, 2007). Today FINRA 
describes itself as the “leading non-governmental regulator for all securities firms doing business 
with the U.S. public.” About FINRA: Leadership, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA 
/Leadership/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 3. “Our chief role is to protect investors by maintaining the fairness of the U.S. capital 
markets.” About FINRA: Leadership, supra note 2. 
 4. The sales representatives are “associated persons” of the brokerage firm under the 
Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18). 
 5. I have previously written about the FINRA securities arbitration process and its importance 
to retail investor confidence. See Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 
PACE L. REV. 1 (2004). 
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ordered restitution of $34 million to injured investors.6 It expelled thirty 
firms, barred 294 individuals, and suspended another 549 individuals.7 
Most of FINRA’s disciplinary proceedings are mundane and do not grab 
headlines. Consisting of a single broker accused of simple fraud, the 
proceedings are frequently uncontested, or if contested, the broker appears 
pro se.8 Thus, FINRA’s enforcement efforts do not garner the headlines that 
the SEC receives,9 and there has been little scholarly interest in FINRA 
disciplinary proceedings.10 
My interest in securities self-regulation and, in particular, FINRA 
sanctions stems from my service as a member of FINRA’s National 
Adjudicatory Council (the NAC) from 2009–2011. The NAC is the 
appellate body that reviews initial decisions in FINRA disciplinary and 
membership proceedings.11 Its fourteen members, consisting of seven 
industry representatives and seven public representatives, engage in 
extended discussions about the facts and circumstances of the cases that 
come before it, and the discussions frequently boil down to whether the 
misconduct was “egregious,” warranting stiffer sanctions, or something less 
serious, sometimes expressed as “serious but not egregious.” FINRA 
adjudicators have broad discretion in determining sanctions;12 there is no 
definition of this key concept “egregious.”13 Although many NAC members 
                                                                                                                 
 6. About FINRA: What We Do, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/WhatWeDo/ (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 7. See FINRA Statistics: Statistical Review 2008–2012, FINRA, http://www.finra.org 
/Newsroom/Statistics/ (last updated July 12, 2013).  
 8. See Yin Wilczek, FINRA Enforcement Numbers on Track to Match 2012 Record, Chief 
Enforcer Says, BLOOMBERG L., http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/finra-enforcement-
numbers-on-track-to-match-2012-record-chief-enforcer-says/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) 
(reporting that FINRA Chief of Enforcement says the home office continues to see a significant 
number of “single broker cases” involving “petty dishonesty”). 
 9. It is reported that FINRA CEO Richard Ketchum now seeks greater visibility for FINRA 
and is “tracking bigger game.” See Ben Protess, Regulator Plans to Expand Its Focus, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Jan. 8, 2013, 12:54 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/regulator-plans-
to-expand-its-focus/. 
 10. Much of the scholarship on securities self-regulation has been written by professors at 
Brooklyn Law School. See, e.g., NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW 
AND REGULATION (4th ed. 2007); Roberta Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory 
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008). 
Recently, Professor James Park discussed FINRA disciplinary proceedings in Rules, Principles, 
and the Competition to Enforce Securities Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV. 115 (2012). 
 11. National Adjudicatory Council (NAC), FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry 
/Enforcement/Adjudication/NAC/index.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 12. March 2006 Revisions to the NASD Sanction Guidelines – FAQ, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/industry/enforcement/sanctionguidelines/p016371 (last visited Nov. 17, 
2013) [hereinafter March 2006 Revisions] (answer to question 7). 
 13. Id. (answer to question 17) (In determining if a violation is egregious, the adjudicators 
“assess the individual facts and circumstances of the case” and “also consider all relevant 
aggravating and mitigating factors.”).  
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are attorneys,14 the discussions do not generally involve legal precedent. 
The habits of a law professor die hard, however, and my experience has 
caused me to think more about the nature of industry self-regulation and, in 
particular, the fundamental principles underlying sanctions imposed by an 
industry regulator. This Article, the product of that exercise, describes, in 
Part I, the evolution of securities self-regulation since the 1938 Maloney 
Act and, in Part II, the theory and practice of FINRA sanctions. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF SECURITIES SELF-REGULATION 
A. CONTRASTING VIEWS ON SECURITIES SELF-REGULATION 
Although regulation of the broker-dealer industry by an SRO has long 
been part of the federal regulatory system, the model of self-regulation has 
not migrated to other participants and products regulated under the federal 
securities laws. In recent years Congress has considered authorizing SROs 
for mutual funds15 and investment advisers;16 in both instances, however, 
the proposals did not move forward. While there can be many reasons why 
new SROs did not come into existence,17 the lack of enthusiasm for them 
may suggest doubts about the self-regulatory model. Both Congress and the 
SEC have viewed it with suspicion and refer to “the natural lack of 
enthusiasm for regulation on the part of the group to be regulated”18 as a 
serious flaw in the self-regulatory model. According to the SEC, “[i]nherent 
in self-regulation is the conflict of interest that exists when an organization 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Of the 2013 NAC members, all of the seven public members are lawyers (five of them law 
professors), and three of the industry members (Mahon, Ostergaard, and Senatore) are lawyers. 
See National Adjudicatory Council, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement 
/Adjudication/NAC/naccommittee/ (last updated Jan. 17, 2013). 
 15. See Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 303, 319–20 & nn.113–14 (2008) (describing congressional consideration of new models 
for regulating mutual fund industry as aftermath of the market timing and late trading abuses). 
 16. Section 914(a)(2)(B) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1830 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11), 
required the SEC to report to Congress on the extent to which an SRO for investment advisers 
would improve the frequency of examinations of investment advisers. The SEC’s study, 
conducted by the Staff of the Division of Investment Management of the SEC, set forth three 
options to address the SEC’s lack of resources to conduct regular examinations, including 
authorization of one or more SROs to examine registered investment advisers. See STAFF OF THE 
DIV. OF INV. MGMT. OF THE SEC, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER EXAMINATIONS 
39 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal.pdf. 
 17. See Mark Schoeff Jr., At Crucial Hearing, Deck Will Be Stacked Against SRO Opponents, 
INVESTMENT NEWS, http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120605/BLOG07/120609962 (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2013). Both the mutual fund and investment advisory industries opposed 
regulation by an SRO, at least in part because of additional costs associated with another 
regulator. Id. In addition, FINRA initially sought to become the SRO for investment advisers, 
which the advisory industry fought because it views the regulatory model for investment advisers 
as fundamentally different from the broker-dealer model. Id. 
 18. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. REP. NO. 93-13, at 145 (1973) [hereinafter SECURITIES 
INDUSTRY STUDY]. 
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both serves the commercial interests of and regulates its members or 
users.”19 In addition to a tendency to protect the economic interests of its 
members, there are persistent concerns about uneven and discriminatory 
enforcement, particularly by larger, more established firms against smaller, 
newer entrants.20 
There is, however, an alternative, positive view of the self-regulatory 
model that has plausibility. Indeed, no one may be more motivated to 
discipline brokers and to remove bad brokers from the industry than the 
industry itself.21 Good firms spend considerable resources on training their 
salespersons and other employees and on maintaining compliance programs 
to prevent violations; bad firms, in contrast, scrimp on these costs. The 
actions of bad actors, nevertheless, will cost the entire industry in terms of 
loss of investor confidence and increased government surveillance.22 In 
addition, self-regulation may be more effective than government regulation 
because of industry experience and expertise, the ability to perform detailed 
oversight functions, and greater acceptance of regulation by the industry 
rather than by the government.23 It is frequently asserted that industry 
regulators can enforce ethical standards that are loftier than mere legal 
compliance,24 although, as I discuss later on, this assertion, if ever true, is 
questionable today.25 Finally, as a practical matter, the size of the brokerage 
industry means that the SEC could not be the primary enforcer without a 
significant infusion of resources, and the federal government prefers that 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 2004 
WL 2648179 § I, at *2 (Nov. 18, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Concept Release]. 
 20. See infra notes 94–103 and accompanying text (discussing the NASD’s 1996 scandal 
involving collusion among market makers); see also SEC Concept Release, supra note 19,  
§ IV.A.I, at *7 (discussing concerns about undue influence of large member firms).  
 21. See Paul S. Grant, The National Association of Securities Dealers: Its Origin and 
Operation, 1942 WIS. L. REV. 597, 608 (describing disciplinary proceedings and stating that “the 
experience and judgment of men in the business are the best qualifications for fair, even strict 
determination of findings and penalties” and “[t]he members passing on complaints are 
determined that the industry will raise its standards”); see also Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and 
Self-Regulation: Resolving The SRO Identity Crisis, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 321–
22 (2007) (describing reciprocal regulation to signal higher standards of care adhered to by SRO 
members). 
 22. William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 8–12 (2013). 
 23. SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
H.R. REP. NO. 88-95, pt. 4, at 693–94 (1963) [hereinafter SEC SPECIAL STUDY]; JOEL SELIGMAN, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 439 (3d ed. 2003). 
 24. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, at 722.  
 25. For example, it is unlikely that the NASD could enforce a view of manipulation that was 
contrary to the SEC’s. See infra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (discussing NASD v. SEC, 
431 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). In Dep’t of Mkt. Regulation v. Leighton, Complaint No. 
CLG050021, 2010 WL 781457, at *2 (FINRA NAC Mar. 3, 2010), the NAC reversed the findings 
of the Extended Hearing Panel’s majority based on a “tenuous” industry standard that limited the 
profits an institutional sales trader could make on trades. 
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the industry pay these regulatory costs.26 For this reason alone, whatever the 
assessment of its strengths and weaknesses, self-regulation of the broker-
dealer industry is here to stay. 
B. THE CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
Section 15A of the Exchange Act, which provides for the registration 
with the SEC of national securities associations, has been amended 
frequently since its initial enactment in 1938 in the Maloney Act.27 We first 
set forth the current statutory framework and then discuss the legislative 
history of the Maloney Act and subsequent significant developments. 
Section 15A provides that an association of brokers and dealers may be 
registered as a “national securities association” (NSA) if it applies for 
registration with the SEC and meets the statutory requirements as well as 
others prescribed by the SEC.28 In order for an association of brokers and 
dealers to be registered as an NSA, the SEC must make a number of 
determinations, including that the association is “able to carry out the 
purposes of [the Exchange Act]” and “to enforce compliance by its 
members and persons associated with its members, with the provisions” of 
the Exchange Act and its rules and the rules of the association.29 The 
association must adopt rules designed for a variety of enumerated purposes, 
including “to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to 
promote just and equitable principles of trade . . . , and, in general, to 
protect investors and the public interest.”30 The association’s rules must 
provide for appropriate discipline of its members and associated persons for 
violations of the Exchange Act and its rules and the association’s rules.31 
The statute authorizes a broad range of sanctions, including “expulsion, 
suspension, limitation of activities, functions, and operations, fine, censure, 
being suspended or barred from being associated with a member, or any 
other fitting sanction.”32 
The statute requires that the association’s rules set forth “a fair 
procedure” for the discipline of its members and associated persons.33 In 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 19, § IV.D, at *19 (citing self-funding as “[o]ne of 
the key historical benefits” of securities self-regulation); DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, SEC, 
MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS app. at VI - 6 
(1994), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/market2000.pdf (explaining that 
experience with the Securities and Exchange Commission Only (SECO) program shows that SEC 
resources necessary to assume direct regulation of broker-dealers “are not realistically 
attainable”). 
 27. Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 75-719, sec. 1, § 15A, 52 Stat. 1070, 1070–75 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2012)). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a).  
 29. Id. § 78o-3(b)(2).  
 30. Id. § 78o-3(b)(6).  
 31. Id. § 78o-3(b)(7).  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. § 78o-3(b)(8).  
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addition, the statute specifies certain procedures to assure notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, as well as the creation of a reviewable record. In 
any disciplinary proceeding, the association must “bring specific charges, 
notify such member or person of, and give him an opportunity to defend 
against, such charges, and keep a record.”34 A determination to impose a 
disciplinary sanction must be accompanied by a statement setting forth (A) 
the act or practice that the member or associated person was found to have 
engaged or found to have omitted; (B) the specific provision of the 
Exchange Act, its rules, or the SRO rules which the act, practice, or 
omission violated; and (C) the sanction imposed and the reason for it.35 
FINRA disciplinary proceedings are heard before a panel chaired by a 
professional hearing officer and two industry representatives.36 Any party 
may seek to appeal a hearing panel’s decision to the NAC, and the NAC 
may decide on its own to hear an appeal.37 The NAC’s decision is FINRA’s 
final action on the matter unless FINRA’s Board of Governors decides to 
review it.38 
All disciplinary proceedings are subject to de novo review by the SEC, 
on the agency’s own motion or upon application by any “aggrieved” 
person.39 So that the SEC is kept apprised of SRO disciplinary proceedings, 
the SRO is required to provide the agency notice of any final disciplinary 
sanction containing such information as the agency requires by rule.40 To 
uphold any sanction imposed by the SRO, the SEC must make findings that 
the member or associated person  
has engaged in such acts or practices, or has omitted such acts, as the self-
regulatory organization has found him to have engaged in or omitted, that 
such acts or practices, or omissions to act, are in violation of such 
provisions of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, [or] the 
rules of the self-regulatory organization, . . . and that such provisions are, 
and were applied in a manner, consistent with the purposes of this 
chapter.41 
 If, however, the SEC does not make the requisite findings of a 
violation, then it must set aside the sanction and, “if appropriate,” remand to 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. § 78o-3(h)(1).  
 35. Id.  
 36. Adjudication, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/Adjudication/ (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2013). FINRA Code of Procedure Rules 9231 and 9232 set forth the criteria for 
selection of panelists. Code of Procedure, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display 
/display_viewall.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3895&record_id=11675 (last visited Nov. 17, 
2013). 
 37. Adjudication, supra note 36. 
 38. Id.  
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2).  
 40. Id. § 78s(d)(1). The notice requirement is set forth in SEC Rule 19d-1. Notices by Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19d-1 (2013). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(1)(A).  
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the SRO for further proceedings.42 Moreover, after the SEC makes the 
requisite findings of a violation, if it finds, “having due regard for the public 
interest and the protection of investors,” that the sanction imposed by the 
SRO “imposes any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of this chapter or is excessive or oppressive,” 
then it may “cancel, reduce, or require the remission of such sanction.”43 
Although the statute is phrased in terms of agency discretion, according to 
the D.C. Circuit, the SEC must, when reviewing a FINRA disciplinary 
action, consider whether the sanction is “excessive or oppressive” and must 
carefully consider any aggravating or mitigating factors relevant to the 
determination of an appropriate sanction.44 
Finally, the Exchange Act provides for judicial review of an SEC final 
order by a “person aggrieved” by the order.45 The standard of review is the 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law” standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.46 
C. EVOLVING VIEWS ON SECURITIES SELF-REGULATION 
Since its inception in 1939, FINRA (including its predecessor, the 
NASD) has evolved from a membership association primarily responsible 
for enforcing industry norms to a regulator that enforces federal securities 
laws as an adjunct of the SEC. This section summarizes the milestones in 
that development.47 
1. The Maloney Act  
The original concept of securities self-regulation was that of 
membership associations having contractual powers to enforce sound 
business practices and ethical standards that were considered beyond the 
scope of government regulation.48 As described by William Douglas:49 
Self-regulation . . . can be pervasive and subtle in its conditioning 
influence over business practices and business morality. By and large, 
government can operate satisfactorily only by proscription. That leaves 
untouched large areas of conduct and activity; some of it susceptible of 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. § 78s(e)(1)(B).  
 43. Id. § 78s(e)(2). The SEC also has discretion to remand to the SRO for further proceedings. 
Id. § 78s(e)(1)(A).  
 44. Saad v. SEC, 718 F.3d 904, 909, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1).  
 46. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 706(2)(A), 80 Stat. 378, 393 (1966) 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012)); Saad, 718 F.3d at 910.  
 47. See generally Karmel, supra note 10 (describing how at least some of the “self” has been 
taken out of FINRA). 
 48. SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 186.  
 49. Justice Douglas served as Chairman of the SEC from 1937–39. SEC Historical Summary 
of Chairmen and Commissioners, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
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government regulation but in fact too minute for satisfactory control; some 
of it lying beyond the periphery of the law in the realm of ethics and 
morality. Into these larger areas self-government and self-government 
alone, can effectively reach.50 
The Exchange Act, as enacted in 1934, designated national securities 
exchanges, principally the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as SROs 
with the responsibility to regulate member broker-dealers but did not 
provide for self-regulation of broker-dealers operating in the over-the-
counter (OTC) markets. Congress addressed this lacuna in 1938. The 
Maloney Act amended the Exchange Act to set up “a system for 
cooperative regulation of the over-the-counter markets, through the 
activities of voluntary associations of investment bankers, dealers and 
brokers doing business in these markets, under appropriate governmental 
supervision.”51 The legislative history identified three aspects to regulation 
of the OTC markets: 
First, to protect the investor and the honest dealer alike from dishonest and 
unfair practices by the submarginal element in the industry; second, to 
cope with those methods of doing business which, while technically 
outside the area of definite illegality, are nevertheless unfair both to 
customer and decent competitor, and are seriously damaging to the 
mechanism of the free and open market; and, third, to afford to the 
investor an economic service the efficiency of which will be 
commensurate with its economic importance, so that the machinery of the 
Nation’s markets will operate to avoid the misdirection of the Nation’s 
savings, which contributes powerfully toward economic depressions and 
breeds distrust of our financial processes.52 
Congress identified two regulatory alternatives. Rejecting the first, a 
“pronounced expansion of the [SEC],” with a large increase in expenditure 
of public funds, accompanied by “a minute, detailed, and rigid regulation of 
business conduct by law,”53 Congress opted for “cooperative regulation,”54 
as described by Senator Maloney: 
The Federal Government, through the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, says to the investment bankers of the country, “You may 
create your own association or associations. You may provide your own 
rules and your own regulations. We want you to run your own business. 
We want a representation, however. We want a right of review and 
supervision.” So, while some of us would like to call what is provided for 
                                                                                                                 
 50. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 18, at 149. 
 51. REGULATION OF OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS, H.R. REP. NO. 75-2307, at 2 (1938); 
REGULATION OF OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS, S. REP. NO. 75-1455, at 1 (1938). 
 52. H.R. REP NO. 75-2307, at 4. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  
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self-regulations, it is in effect a cooperative regulation . . . . It is purely 
voluntary.55 
Similarly, the purpose of the legislation was “to enable the people of 
this business to guide and direct the affairs of their own industry under 
government supervision.”56 The legislation presupposed that “regulation 
can best be achieved by the efforts of honest brokers and dealers themselves 
. . . .”57 The SEC is “injected into the association or associations to prevent 
the growth of monopoly and to protect the rights of minorities, and the little 
dealer as well as the small buyers.”58 
Consistent with the concept that the membership associations would 
enforce their own rules, Exchange Act section 15A, as originally enacted, 
did not explicitly give NSAs the authority to bring disciplinary proceedings 
for violations of federal securities laws and regulations.59 It was not until 
the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act that NSAs had express authority 
to enforce the Exchange Act and its rules, although prior thereto, the NASD 
had enforced at least some federal securities provisions through its general 
requirement of “high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable 
principles.”60 
The NASD was established in 1939 and was—and continues to be 
through its successor, FINRA—the sole NSA for broker-dealers.61 
2. The SEC’s Special Study of Securities Markets 
In 1961 Congress appropriated funds for the SEC to undertake “a broad 
study of the adequacy of investor protection in the securities markets,”62 
including an examination of the OTC market. Joel Seligman, the foremost 
historian of the SEC, described the Special Study of Securities Markets (the 
Special Study), conducted by a quasi-independent group within the SEC, as 
“the single most influential document published in the history of the 
SEC.”63 A principal component of the Special Study is “a factual 
documentation of the limits of self-regulation in the securities industry,”64 
including the performance of the securities exchanges and the NASD as 
well as the SEC’s oversight of them. 
The Special Study described the evolution of the NASD from “a 
somewhat unique experiment in supervised self-regulation” to “an 
                                                                                                                 
 55. 83 CONG. REC. 4451 (1938) (statement of Sen. Francis Maloney). 
 56. Senator Francis Maloney, Radio Address on Over-the-Counter Securities Markets (Feb. 
25, 1938), in 83 CONG. REC. app. at 789 (1938). 
 57. Id. at 790.  
 58. Id. 
 59. See SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, at 646. 
 60. Id. at 646 n.420.  
 61. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 62. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, pt. 1, at iii (Letter of Transmittal).  
 63. SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 299.  
 64. Id.  
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established part of the regulatory scheme exerting a substantial influence on 
numerous phases of the securities industry.”65 In its judgment, the NASD 
was at a crossroads66 because “its capacity to do its job is overtaxed:”67 
“The NASD’s job of self-regulation is an enormous one in every 
dimension, but from the beginning it has sought to adhere to a concept of 
self-regulation with a maximum emphasis on ‘self’—members in the 
securities business regulating themselves—and with minimal reliance on 
full-time paid staff.”68 
With respect to the NASD’s disciplinary proceedings, the Special Study 
reported that the NASD “placed great emphasis on informality and 
simplicity in all phases of the disciplinary process”69—what was important 
to the membership was that decisions were “made by businessmen based 
upon their knowledge of the procedures of their business.”70 The Special 
Study concluded that the principal problem with disciplinary proceedings 
was lack of efficiency and speed in handling cases;71 it also found troubling 
disparities in the penalties for certain kinds of misconduct that suggested 
discrimination against smaller firms.72 
To address the NASD’s deficiencies, the Special Study called for the 
creation of a larger professional staff with greater responsibilities,73 
centralization of enforcement authority, and permanent hearing officers for 
disciplinary hearings.74 In addition, the Special Study observed that the 
NASD’s “purpose of promoting voluntary compliance with ethical 
standards beyond the reach of formal regulation has limited its resort to 
codification or other ‘legalistic’ techniques that might ease its burden of 
day-to-day regulation.”75 In short, in the view of the Special Study, the 
NASD should become more bureaucratic, with a professional staff and a 
rulebook. These recommendations signaled a significant change in the 
                                                                                                                 
 65. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, at 673.  
 66. Id. at 674.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.; see Howard C. Westwood & Edward G. Howard, Self-Government in the Securities 
Business, 17 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 518, 533 (1952) (describing how, when the NASD applied to 
register with the SEC, it originally contemplated that it would not need a paid staff, but the SEC 
objected and also thought the proposed schedule of membership fees was too low). 
 69. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, at 664.  
 70. Id. at 665 (quoting letter from the NASD’s executive director); Grant, supra note 21, at 
608 (describing disciplinary proceedings and stating that “the experience and judgment of men in 
the business are the best qualifications for fair, even strict determination of findings and penalties” 
and “[t]he members passing on complaints are determined that the industry will raise its 
standards”). 
 71. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 23, at 681.  
 72. Id. at 666 (describing the relative leniency in free-riding cases in contrast to net capital 
violations; the former is not found primarily in marginal firms).  
 73. Id. at 676. “[T]he NASD’s paid staff should be increased in size, stature, and responsibility 
. . . .” Id. at 680.   
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 679.  
2013] Punishing Bad Brokers 33 
concept of securities self-regulation that was implemented in subsequent 
amendments to the Exchange Act. 
3. 1964 Amendments to the Exchange Act 
In 1964 Congress amended section 15A of the Exchange Act to require, 
for the first time, that NSAs have standards of financial responsibility for 
member firms and standards of training, experience, and other 
qualifications for associated persons. The amendment also permitted the 
NASD to bring disciplinary proceedings against associated persons without 
proceeding against their firms.76 According to the Senate report 
accompanying the legislation, the amendments “contemplate[d] an even 
greater degree of reliance upon self-regulation, although under somewhat 
more intensive [SEC] supervision.”77 
In addition, the Senate report essentially repudiated the Maloney Act’s 
concept of a voluntary membership association enforcing through contract 
its business and ethical standards on its members and instead emphasized 
that the association was a regulator acting pursuant to delegated authority: 
“Registered securities associations are not private clubs. They are organized 
under statutory authority to perform, under governmental oversight, 
regulatory functions in the over-the-counter securities market.”78 
This emphasis on delegated government power becomes the dominant 
theme in subsequent congressional consideration of the concept of 
securities self-regulation, although lip service is still paid to the Maloney 
Act’s concept of self-regulation. 
4. The Securities Industry Study of 1973 
In 1970, when Congress enacted the Securities Investor Protection Act 
to address the crisis caused by the failures of a number of large NYSE firms 
and to deal with the threat of loss of investor confidence, a number of 
Senators expressed concern that the securities industry was in need of 
fundamental reform.79 As a result, in 1971 the Senate authorized a thorough 
study of the securities industry and the securities markets, conducted by the 
Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, which was completed in 1973.80 The Securities Industry 
Study made a number of conclusions and recommendations, many of them 
concerning industry self-regulation, including that “[t]he division of 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Summary and Interpretation of Amendments to Securities Act of 1933 and Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Contained in the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Securities Act 
Release No. 4725, Exchange Act Release No. 7425, 1964 WL 67875, at *15 (Sept. 29, 1964). 
 77. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION LEGISLATION 1963, S. REP. NO. 88-379, at 42 
(1963). 
 78. Id.  
 79. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 18, at 1.  
 80. Id. at 3. 
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responsibility between the SEC and the self-regulatory organizations 
requires redefinition to establish clearer lines of responsibility for 
decisionmaking.”81 The Securities Industry Study emphasized that  
there is a common and serious misunderstanding of the nature and limits 
of the concept of self-regulation . . . . [S]elf-regulation is thought to mean 
that the securities industry regulates itself and therefore is not regulated by 
the government. Such a conception of self-regulation is seriously 
misleading in failing to acknowledge the essential and continuing role of 
the federal government.82  
The Securities Industry Study expressed a great deal of skepticism about 
securities self-regulation and described the 
inherent limitations in allowing an industry to regulate itself . . . : the 
natural lack of enthusiasm for regulation on the part of the group to be 
regulated, the temptation to use a façade of industry regulation as a shield 
to ward off more meaningful regulation, the tendency for businessmen to 
use collective action to advance their interests through the imposition of 
purely anti-competitive restraints as opposed to those justified by 
regulatory needs, and a resistance to changes in the regulatory pattern 
because of vested economic interests in its preservation.83 
Despite this lack of enthusiasm for securities self-regulation, the 
Securities Industry Study acknowledged practical realities: that “the 
Congress was well aware of the serious practical problems confronting the 
government if it were to assume the entire regulatory burden.”84 
Accordingly, Congress established a regulatory model that balanced the 
“limitations and dangers”85 of self-regulation against “‘the sheer 
ineffectiveness of attempting to assure [regulation] directly through the 
Government on a wide scale.’”86 
In addition, the Securities Industry Study did acknowledge that 
securities self-regulation had significant advantages apart from its practical 
necessity, which included bringing industry members’ expertise to bear on 
the regulatory issues and involving industry members in the regulatory 
process.87 Indeed, what it identified as the most important advantage 
harkened back to the Maloney Act’s original concept: “its potential for 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Id. Seligman notes that Congress was frustrated with the SEC’s passivity in supervising the 
SROs and that “[b]etween 1971 and 1975, the SEC’s supervision of stock market regulation was 
the subject of almost incessant congressional hearings and reports.” SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 
443. 
 82. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 18, at 137.  
 83. Id. at 145 (footnote omitted).  
 84. Id. at 146.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. (quotation marks in original).  
 87. Id. at 149.  
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establishing and enforcing what Mr. Justice Douglas referred to as ‘ethical 
standards beyond those any law can establish.’”88 
5. 1975 Amendments to the Exchange Act 
Somewhat surprisingly, the NASD did not have express statutory 
authority to enforce the Exchange Act and its rules until the 1975 
amendments to the Exchange Act.89 The 1975 amendments also 
strengthened SEC oversight in several key respects, including procedures 
applicable to SEC review of SRO proposed rule changes90 and SRO 
disciplinary actions.91 In addition, Congress reinforced the notion that SROs 
are not “private clubs” by requiring that their governing bodies have at least 
one public member, i.e., not from the industry.92 
Once again, the legislative history emphasized that “self-regulatory 
organizations exercise authority subject to SEC oversight. They have no 
authority to regulate independently of the SEC’s control.”93 
6. The NASD’s 1996 Scandal Involving Collusion Among 
Market Makers 
In the 1990s, both the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division 
and the SEC investigated allegations of abusive practices by Nasdaq market 
makers to suppress competition and mislead customers.94 In 1996 the SEC 
and the NASD entered a settlement after the agency instituted public 
proceedings against the NASD.95 The SEC, in addition to making findings 
of misconduct in the Nasdaq market by Nasdaq market makers, found that 
the NASD inadequately enforced its rules applicable to market makers and 
processed certain membership applications in a manner inconsistent with its 
rules, both of which were attributable to the undue influence of market 
makers in the NASD regulatory processes.96 The SEC also found that the 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. (footnote omitted).  
 89. Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 94-29, sec. 12, § 15A, 89 Stat. 97, 127–31 (1975). 
 90. Id. sec. 16, § 19(b)–(c), 89 Stat. at 147–50.  
 91. Id. sec. 16, § 19(d)–(e), 89 Stat. at 150–51.  
 92. Id. sec. 12(2), § 15A(b)(4), 89 Stat. at 127.  
 93. SECURITIES ACTS AMENDMENTS OF 1975, S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 23 (1975), reprinted in 
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 201. 
 94. SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
REGARDING THE NASD AND THE NASDAQ MARKET (1996) [hereinafter SEC, REPORT PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 21(A)], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/nasdaq21a.htm. 
 95. The SEC can impose sanctions on an SRO if it finds, on the record and after notice and 
opportunity for a hearing, that the SRO has violated or is unable to comply with any provision of 
the Securities Exchange Act and its rules, or the SRO’s own rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (2012). 
 96. NASD, Exchange Act Release No. 37,538, 1996 WL 447193 (Aug. 8, 1996) [hereinafter 
NASD Release]. For background on the Nasdaq trading practices at issue, see SELIGMAN, supra 
note 23, at 698–702. Arthur Levitt, the SEC Chairman at the time, acknowledged that the SEC 
itself “failed to see that the NASD had gradually been taken over by a cabal of dealers who used 
the NASD’s disciplinary process to punish certain players, such as daytraders, while failing to 
prosecute serious infractions by market-makers.” Id. at 699 (quoting ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON 
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influence exerted by the market makers resulted in the NASD staff’s 
targeting less-favored constituencies in examinations and disciplinary 
actions.97 The NASD did not admit or deny the findings. 
In response to the scandal, prior to the SEC settlement, the NASD had 
already accepted the recommendation of its Select Committee headed by 
former Senator Warren Rudman to review Nasdaq structure and 
governance98 and determined to separate the NASD’s market and regulatory 
functions.99 The SEC censured the NASD and required it to consent to a 
number of reforms, including reforms designed to reduce the influence of 
members over regulatory and disciplinary matters. Thus, the settlement 
required “at least 50% independent public and non-industry membership on 
its Board of Governors” and on the boards of all subsidiaries and affiliates 
that have self-regulatory functions, and on the major NASD committees, 
including the predecessor to the NAC, the National Business Conduct 
Committee.100 The participation of industry members in disciplinary 
proceedings was also reduced. The NASD was required to institute the use 
of professional hearing officers—“who shall be attorneys with appropriate 
experience and training”—to preside over disciplinary proceedings.101 In 
addition, the NASD was required “to provide for the autonomy and 
independence of the regulatory staff” so that the staff would have sole 
discretion as to what matters to investigate and prosecute, subject only to 
supervision of the Board of Governors, and would be “generally insulated 
from the commercial interests of its members and the Nasdaq market.”102 
As a result of this demonstration of the fatal flaw of securities self-
regulation—the undue influence exerted by powerful members—the 
NASD’s transformation into a professional regulator largely independent of 
its membership, as recommended by the 1963 Special Study, was 
substantially accomplished. Today, after the 2007 consolidation, FINRA 
describes itself as the “leading non-governmental regulator for all securities 
firms doing business with the U.S. public.”103 
                                                                                                                 
THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW 
183–84 (2002)).  
 97. Specifically, NASD staff targeted day trading firms that used Nasdaq’s Small Order 
Execution System. See SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A), supra note 94, at 40–44.  
 98. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-02-362, SECURITIES MARKETS: 
COMPETITION AND MULTIPLE REGULATORS HEIGHTEN CONCERNS ABOUT SELF-REGULATION 11 
(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/234468.pdf. 
 99. Id. at 8; see also SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 701–02.  
 100. NASD Release, supra note 96, § IV.B.1, at *3.  
 101. Id. § IV.B.3.  
 102. Id. § IV.B.4, at *4.  
 103. About FINRA: Leadership, supra note 2 (emphasis added). 
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7. The Current View of Securities Self-Regulation 
As this brief history demonstrates, the concept of FINRA has evolved 
from a voluntary membership organization enforcing through contract its 
business practices and ethical standards to a regulator that is independent 
from its membership, whose authority to enforce federal securities laws 
derives from Congress and is subject to SEC oversight. Two appellate 
opinions underscore this transformation. 
In NASD v. SEC, the NASD sought judicial review of an SEC order that 
set aside the NAC’s findings of market manipulation in violation of 
Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and the sanctions imposed for 
that violation, which were expulsion of the member firm and an industry 
bar of its owner.104 The SEC concluded that the evidence did not establish 
that the respondents committed market manipulation.105 In ruling that the 
NASD did not have standing to appeal the SEC order, the D.C. Circuit 
described it as a “quasi-governmental agency, with express statutory 
authority to adjudicate actions against members who are accused of illegal 
securities practices and to sanction members found to have violated the 
Exchange Act or [SEC] regulations issued pursuant thereto.”106 The 
NASD’s subordinate status was clear. Under the statutory scheme providing 
for securities self-regulation, “[t]he NASD’s authority to discipline its 
members for violations of federal securities law is entirely derivative. The 
authority it exercises ultimately belongs to the SEC, and the legal views of 
the self-regulatory organization must yield to the Commission’s view of the 
law.”107 
The court held that the NASD, as a first-level adjudicator, was not a 
“person aggrieved” that can appeal an SEC decision under Exchange Act 
section 25(a).108 It rejected summarily the NASD’s argument that it was “an 
aggrieved person” based on its staff’s frustration in its mission because it 
would be unable to bring disciplinary proceedings except in the narrow 
circumstances covered by the SEC decision:109 “Simply put, the NASD 
                                                                                                                 
 104. NASD v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 804–05 (D.C. Cir. 2005). As the court noted throughout the 
opinion, this was the first case in nearly seventy years in which the NASD sought judicial review 
of an SEC order when the NASD was acting as an adjudicator. Id. at 811. 
 105. The NAC stated that the question presented by the appeal was “whether a market marker 
that trades a small volume of stock can violate the antifraud provisions of SEC and NASD rules 
when the evidence demonstrates that the firm took actions that were designed to artificially 
increase the price of the stock” and answered the question in the affirmative. Mkt. Regulation v. 
Elgindy, Complaint No. CMS000015, 2003 WL 21203080, at *1 (NASD NAC May 7, 2003). The 
SEC, however, concluded that the record did not support a finding that the respondents’ actions 
were part of a manipulative scheme. Elgindy, Exchange Act Release No. 49,389, 2004 WL 
865791, at *4–5 (Mar. 10, 2004). 
 106. NASD, 431 F.3d at 804.  
 107. Id. at 806.  
 108. Id. at 805. 
 109. Id. at 809–10.  
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appears before this court as a disgruntled first-level tribunal, complaining 
because it has been reversed by a higher tribunal.”110 
The question left unaddressed by NASD v. SEC was whether FINRA 
could adopt and enforce its own definition of market manipulation apart 
from the Exchange Act as a violation of its requirement that members 
observe “high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable 
principles of trade.”111 Fiero v. FINRA,112 discussed next, suggests that 
courts would not be receptive to efforts to impose significant sanctions for 
violations that were based solely on ethical standards that go beyond the 
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act. 
Fiero even more clearly demonstrates that courts view FINRA’s powers 
as exclusively derived from the Exchange Act.113 In 2002 the NAC 
affirmed a hearing panel’s findings that Fiero Brothers, Inc., a member 
firm, and John Fiero, its president (collectively, the Fieros) engaged in 
market manipulation and its sanctions of expulsion/bar from the industry 
and a $1 million fine imposed jointly and severally on the Fieros.114 The 
Fieros did not appeal the NAC’s decision to the SEC.115 After the Fieros 
refused to pay the fine, FINRA commenced an action in New York state 
court.116 The trial court awarded judgment in its favor, upholding its 
authority to bring the action under contract law, because the Fieros had 
agreed to comply with the SRO’s rules, including imposition of fines and 
sanctions, when the firm became a NASD member and Fiero became an 
associated person of the firm.117 The court further noted that “‘New York 
state courts have long recognized the right of a private membership 
organization to impose fines on its members, when authorized to do so by 
statute, charter or by-laws.’”118 New York’s highest court, however, 
subsequently reversed on the ground that the federal courts possessed 
exclusive jurisdiction because the FINRA complaint was an action to 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. at 809.  
 111. FINRA Rules, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid 
=2403&element_id=607&record_id=609 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (FINRA Rule 2010, 
formerly NASD Conduct Rule 2110). 
 112. Fiero v. FINRA, 660 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 113. See id. at 576.  
 114. The hearing panel also found, and the NAC affirmed, a finding that the Fieros violated a 
NASD Rule. The NAC imposed the $1 million fine for the market manipulation claim. Dep’t of 
Enforcement v. Fiero, Complaint No. CAF980002, 2002 WL 31476976, at *33 n.60 (NASD NAC 
Oct. 28, 2002). 
 115. If the Fieros had appealed and the SEC had affirmed the NAC fine, the SEC would have 
had the authority to bring a proceeding to collect the fine under Exchange Act § 21(e). Fiero, 660 
F.3d at 574–75; but see id. at 575 n.7 (expressly noting that the issue of SEC authority was not 
before the court).  
 116. NASD v. Fiero, No. 102755/04, 2006 WL 5251396 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 11, 2006). 
 117. NASD v. Fiero, 882 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 2008). 
 118. Fiero, 660 F.3d at 572 (citing NASD v. Fiero, No. 102755/04, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Sept. 12, 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 882 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 2008)).  
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enforce a liability or duty created under the Exchange Act.119 The Fieros 
then brought an action in federal district court, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that FINRA had no authority to collect fines through judicial 
proceedings; FINRA filed a counterclaim, again seeking to enforce the fine 
under contract theory.120 Reversing the district court’s judgment in favor of 
FINRA, the court of appeals held that the Exchange Act did not confer on 
FINRA authority to bring judicial actions to enforce collection of its 
fines.121 
The court of appeals’ analysis was based on the premise that “where 
FINRA enforces statutory or administrative rules, or enforces its own rules 
promulgated pursuant to statutory or administrative authority, it is 
exercising the powers granted to it under the Exchange Act.”122 The court 
of appeals relied principally on the statutory language: while Exchange Act  
section 15A(b) confers on SROs the power and obligation to discipline 
members and impose sanctions, including fines, the Exchange Act did not 
expressly confer on SROs the power to bring judicial actions to collect 
fines.123 The court contrasted this with statutory provisions conferring 
express power on the SEC to seek judicial enforcement of monetary 
penalties and concluded on this basis that the omission of comparable 
power to SROs was intentional.124 The court also found that FINRA’s 
breach of contract theory undermined Exchange Act section 27, which 
confers on federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the Exchange 
Act, explaining that “FINRA contract enforcement actions may bristle with 
Exchange Act legal issues because the most serious fines levied by FINRA 
will be for member violations of the Act.”125 Assuming that the court was 
correct in its assertion that FINRA’s largest fines are imposed for Exchange 
Act violations, it did not explain how an action brought to collect a fine 
would require courts to interpret the Exchange Act.126 
The court acknowledged that its interpretation left a “seemingly 
inexplicable nature of a gap in the FINRA enforcement scheme: fines may 
be levied but not collected.”127 The court, however, did not find this 
troublesome because FINRA had another “draconian sanction not involving 
court action:”128 it could expel the member from the industry for non-
                                                                                                                 
 119. Fiero, 882 N.E.2d at 882. 
 120. Fiero v. FINRA, 606 F. Supp. 2d 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 121. Fiero, 882 N.E.2d at 882. 
 122. Fiero, 660 F.3d at 575–76 (emphasis added).  
 123. Id. at 574.  
 124. Id. at 575.  
 125. Id. at 576.  
 126. Cf. Fiero v. FINRA, 606 F. Supp. 2d 500, 517–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting this 
argument because FINRA is not suing for violations of securities laws or introducing disciplinary 
proceedings as evidence of the Fieros’ securities violations).  
 127. Fiero, 660 F.3d at 576.  
 128. Id.  
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payment or, in this case, refuse to permit the Fieros to re-enter the industry 
until they paid the fine.129 In addition, in a non sequitur, the court observed 
that a violator of the Exchange Act would likely face a “panoply of private 
and SEC remedies.”130 
Both opinions view the Exchange Act as the exclusive source of 
authority for FINRA; the organization has no independent power or 
authority. In addition, both opinions adhere to a literal, non-expansive 
interpretation of the association’s statutory authority. Neither opinion offers 
FINRA any encouragement to explore new regulatory approaches or to be 
innovative in its approach to regulation; both opinions emphasize that 
FINRA was asserting a power that it had not previously attempted to 
exercise. 
The current view of securities self-regulation may be a significant 
cabining of FINRA’s ability to enforce ethical standards beyond the 
antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act for the protection of retail 
investors. Yet, because of the seriousness of the sanctions, broker-dealers 
and associated persons need fair notice of what kinds of conduct constitute 
violations; the law cannot be “soft” or vague. Moreover, the 1996 market-
maker scandal demonstrated that the historic concern for undue industry 
influence was not misplaced and that Congress was correct in identifying 
the need for more independence from the industry and greater SEC 
oversight. 
II. FINRA SANCTIONS 
As previously described, the Exchange Act requires FINRA to adopt 
rules to regulate the conduct of its members131 and to provide for 
appropriate discipline of firms and associated persons for violations of the 
Exchange Act and its rules, as well as the SRO’s rules.132 The statute 
authorizes a broad range of sanctions and confers broad discretion on 
FINRA to determine the appropriate sanction, subject to the SEC’s power 
to reduce a sanction if it imposes an undue burden on competition or is 
“excessive or oppressive.”133 Part II fleshes out the bare statutory 
framework and explores the theory and practice of FINRA sanctions. 
A. REMEDIAL VERSUS PUNITIVE SANCTIONS 
Recall that this Article started with the premise that it is likely, and 
indeed understandable, that members of the investing public who have been 
harmed by broker-dealer misconduct want to see that bad brokers are 
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 131. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2012). 
 132. Id. § 78o-3(b)(7). 
 133. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.  
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punished for their wrongdoing.134 Public approval for regulators may 
decrease if they are seen as “soft” on violators; Robert Khuzami, the former 
SEC Director of the Enforcement Division, frequently reminded people that 
the SEC was not a federal prosecutor.135 The investing public may be 
especially skeptical about industry regulators and suspect them of being soft 
on offenders. Moreover, regulators (like the rest of us) probably find it 
satisfying to punish; industry regulators may feel a strong sense of 
disapproval toward conduct that reflects badly on the industry as a whole.136 
Nevertheless, regulators may not impose sanctions as retribution, because 
the wrongdoers deserve it, however satisfying that may be to both the 
regulators and the investing public.137 
Why is it impermissible for FINRA to punish bad brokers for their 
conduct? First, FINRA is a private actor, not an arm of the federal 
government. Courts, however, have long recognized that Congress can 
confer on private bodies the power to impose sanctions, including the 
revocation of licenses.138 The right of disciplined firms and associated 
persons to seek de novo SEC review of FINRA’s findings and sanctions, 
and the statutory requirement that the agency make its own findings, 
provide an additional layer of protection for the individual or firm found to 
have committed a violation.139 In their review of disciplinary orders, the 
federal courts of appeals do not distinguish between SEC orders that affirm 
FINRA disciplinary sanctions and SEC orders that affirm sanctions 
imposed through the SEC’s administrative hearing system; both are 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See, e.g., 113 Madoff Victims Tell Their Stories, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2009, at C3, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124511290745717267.html (reproducing victim-
impact statements from 113 victims of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme filed with court in 
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 135. See, e.g., Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks Before the Consumer 
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SEC, 34 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting challenges to disciplinary sanctions, noting that the 
individual voluntarily submitted himself to the discipline of a self-regulating association whose 
power to enforce its standards of conduct “makes its imprimatur meaningful and commercially 
valuable to its membership”). In addition, the laws of many states recognize that private-
membership associations may impose sanctions on members when authorized by statute or 
governance documents. E.g., NASD v. Fiero, No. 102755/04, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 12, 
2005), rev’d on other grounds, 882 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 2008). 
 139. See Cody v. SEC, 693 F.3d 251, 257 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that court reviews SEC order 
rather than FINRA’s decision); Heath v. SEC, 586 F.3d 122, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that 
any procedural errors committed by the hearing officer are cured by the SEC’s thorough de novo 
review of the record). 
42 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
considered SEC orders. Accordingly, parties rarely raise the objection that 
FINRA is not a government body, and if the objection is raised, courts 
quickly dispense with it.  
The Exchange Act requires that the SRO provide a “fair procedure” for 
its disciplinary proceedings,140 which specifically includes providing 
specific charges and an opportunity to be heard.141 Fairness requires that the 
firm or individual has notice that the charged conduct was illegal142 and that 
the SRO bring the charges without undue delay.143 The protections 
accorded those charged with misconduct, however, do not raise to the level 
of constitutional protections required when the government seeks to impose 
criminal sanctions on those charged with misconduct: need for proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, trial by jury, privilege against self-incrimination 
(for individuals), protection from double jeopardy, and right to legal 
representation.144 Courts have dispensed with these constitutional 
protections so long as the sanction is remedial and not penal, or 
punishment, for past offenses.145 The Supreme Court defers to legislative 
intent, so that conferring a regulatory authority with the power to impose 
sanctions denominated as “civil” is prima facie evidence of congressional 
intent to provide for a non-criminal sanction.146 The Court, however, 
recognizes that even if Congress intended civil sanctions, a statutory 
scheme can be so punitive either in purpose or effect as to “‘transfor[m] 
                                                                                                                 
 140. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(8) (2012). Courts have held that the FINRA procedures mandated by 
the Exchange Act require the substance of procedural due process, Cody, 693 F.3d at 357, and are 
fair, see Busacca v. SEC, 449 Fed. App’x 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2011), and that procedural errors 
committed by the hearing officer can be cured by the SEC’s thorough de novo review of the 
record. Heath, 586 F.3d at 142–43. 
 141. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h)(1). 
 142. Even a minimal sanction can be excessive if the individual could not fairly understand that 
the conduct was illegal. Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 143. SRO disciplinary proceedings are not subject to any statute of limitations; “a successful 
laches defense requires a lack of due diligence by the [SRO], and prejudice to the [respondent].” 
Gluckman, Exchange Act Release No. 41,628, 1999 WL 507864, at *6–7 (July 20, 1999). The 
SEC dismissed, for the first time, an SRO disciplinary proceeding on fairness grounds because of 
the age of the case, without a showing of prejudice, in Hayden, Exchange Act Release No. 42,772, 
2000 WL 571683, at *2 (May 11, 2000), because an SRO has a “statutory obligation to ensure the 
fairness and integrity of its disciplinary proceedings.” In Dep’t of Enforcement v. Morgan Stanley 
DW Inc., Discip. Proceeding No. CAF000045, 2002 NASD Discip. LEXIS 11 (NASD NAC July 
29, 2002), the NAC interpreted Hayden as setting forth a fairness test based on equitable 
principles and requiring consideration of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 
 144. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 96–103 (1991) (holding that because the 
Congress set forth a preponderance of evidence standard for disciplinary proceedings under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, policy arguments for 
a higher standard were inapposite). 
 145. Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 146. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99–103 (1997) (holding that the statutory scheme 
under which Office of Comptroller of Currency imposed penalties and debarment on bank officers 
demonstrated congressional intent that such penalties be deemed civil, so that the double jeopardy 
clause did not protect against criminal prosecution). 
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what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’”147 
The Court has identified relevant factors in distinguishing between punitive 
and remedial sanctions:  
(1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; 
(2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether 
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation 
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and 
deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; 
(6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected 
is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned.148  
Legislative intent is entitled to judicial deference; “‘only the clearest proof’ 
will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been 
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”149 
The Exchange Act provides for a regulatory system of civil sanctions, 
and FINRA consistently describes its sanctions as remedial.150 Therefore, 
FINRA sanctions are presumed to be civil remedies, yet a too-severe 
sanction may be deemed punitive. The question remains: what is the 
distinction between kicking someone out of the industry as punishment and 
kicking someone out as a remedial sanction? A sanction imposed for the 
purpose of punishing someone for past conduct, as retribution for a wrong 
or just deserts, is unquestionably punitive in nature.151 Sanctions imposed to 
compensate the government for a loss (restitution),152 or disgorgement of 
ill-gotten gains,153 by contrast, are unquestionably remedial. Deterrence as a 
rationale is less clear. Traditionally, sanctions imposed as deterrence were 
generally viewed as punitive.154 The modern view, however, is to 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Id. at 99 (quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)).  
 148. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 
(1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Mendoza-Martinez, the Court found that a statute 
taking away U.S. citizenship for evading military service was punitive based on congressional 
descriptions of the purpose of the statute. 372 U.S. at 186. 
 149. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)).  
 150. See infra notes 178–181. 
 151. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144. In ruling that a state statute requiring registration of 
convicted sex offenders was non-punitive and therefore did not violate the ex post facto clause, 
the Supreme Court acknowledged that public shaming as the motive for sanctions may raise 
constitutional problems. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003). 
 152. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (establishing a gross proportionality 
test for determining if forfeiture would violate the excessive fines clause). 
 153. Sweeney, Exchange Act Release No. 29,884, 1991 WL 716756, at *5 (Oct. 30, 1991) 
(stating that, generally, disgorgement should be ordered in all cases in which the SRO can identify 
direct financial gain obtained as a result of wrongful activity, in order to remedy past wrongs and 
deter future misconduct). Disgorgement amounts must be approximately equal to the unjust 
enrichment or else they are unreasonable and excessive. Hateley v. SEC, 8 F.3d 653, 656 (9th Cir. 
1993). 
 154. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329. In Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the 
court held that a “penalty,” as the term is used in the statute of limitations for government 
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distinguish between general and specific deterrence. Specific deterrence is 
recognized as remedial, serving to protect the public by removing the 
person from the industry.155 General deterrence is also recognized as an 
appropriate factor to take into consideration, at least where the offense was 
egregious.156 General deterrence, however, is not appropriate without 
specific deterrence; it is not permissible to make an example of someone 
who does not otherwise warrant specific deterrence.157 Accordingly, a bar, 
expulsion, or long-term suspension is considered remedial so long as there 
are reasons as to why the sanction serves to protect the trading public from 
future harm.158 
In reviewing SEC orders imposing sanctions,159 courts recognize that 
they should not ordinarily substitute their judgment for the agency’s as to 
measures necessary to protect the public interest because “the relation of 
remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.”160 
Nevertheless, courts do more than rubber-stamp the SEC order, and, at least 
in instances of a bar or long-term suspension, courts will consider whether 
the sanction is appropriately remedial and not punitive.161 Steadman v. 
                                                                                                                 
sanctions, is a form of punishment that goes beyond remedying the damage caused by the harmful 
conduct. 
 155. McCurdy v. SEC, 396 F.3d 1258, 1264–65 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting argument that a 
one-year suspension against a certified public accountant was punitive because it was based on his 
past reckless conduct, finding it “difficult to imagine how any suspension, remedial or not, could 
be based on anything but past actions,” and making it clear that the purpose of the suspension was 
to protect the public); Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1940) (rejecting argument that 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required to expel member). A six-month disciplinary 
suspension “would less resemble punishment if the SEC had focused on [the individual’s] current 
competence or the degree of risk she posed to the public.” Johnson, 87 F.3d at 489.  
 156. Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979) (requiring SEC to articulate 
compelling reasons for permanent expulsion, e.g., that violation is so egregious that it mandates 
permanent expulsion as a deterrent to others); Busacca v. SEC, 449 Fed. App’x 886, 893 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that SEC’s acknowledged aim of encouraging other supervisors to 
respond to operational problems was impermissibly punitive). 
 157. PAZ Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 494 F.3d 1059, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting and agreeing with 
Second Circuit’s statement on general deterrence); McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 
2005) (stating that general deterrence is not sufficient justification for expulsion or suspension, 
although it may be considered as part of the overall remedial inquiry); Beck v. SEC, 430 F.2d 673, 
674–75 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that four-month suspension was punitive where it did not appear 
that the broker would be inclined to commit any further misconduct). 
 158. Ricupero v. SEC, 436 Fed. App’x 31, 33 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting McCarthy, 406 F.3d at 
188) (In reviewing an SEC order sustaining SRO sanctions, the foremost consideration is whether 
it “protects the trading public from further harm.”). 
 159. Courts do not draw a distinction between SEC orders that originated within the SEC 
(through an ALJ) or originated with an SRO, since an agency’s review of an SRO order is de novo 
and it must make the requisite findings. See supra notes 39–41. 
 160. O’Leary v. SEC, 424 F.2d 908, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The courts acknowledge that there is 
considerable discretion in determining the appropriate sanction, recognizing only that “[p]erhaps 
gross disparities in sanctions for similar behavior would at least suggest underlying bias.” 
D’Alessio v. SEC, 380 F.3d 112, 125 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 
 161. E.g., Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1141 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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SEC,162 a frequently cited case, lists factors that essentially amount to a 
prediction about whether the person is likely to engage in misconduct in the 
future:  
[1] the egregiousness of the defendant’s actions, [2] the isolated or 
recurrent nature of the infraction, [3] the degree of scienter involved, [4] 
the sincerity of the defendant’s assurances against future violations, [5] the 
defendant’s recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct, and [6] the 
likelihood that the defendant’s occupation will present opportunities for 
future violations.163  
Another frequently cited opinion, McCarthy v. SEC,164 identified as 
relevant factors: “[t]he seriousness of the offense, the corresponding harm 
to the trading public, the potential gain to the broker for disobeying the 
rules, the potential for repetition in light of the current regulatory and 
enforcement regime, and the deterrent value to the offending broker and 
others.”165 Other courts state more generally that sanctions are punitive if 
they are too severe or draconian.166 What the courts require is that the SEC 
considered the facts and circumstances of the particular case, made the 
requisite findings of a violation, and articulated reasons why the sanction is 
appropriate for the particular violation. Courts have criticized boilerplate 
findings of wrongdoing167 and do not find it sufficient if the agency merely 
stated, in effect, that the conduct was illegal or that the individual in 
question was a bad person.168 Courts have vacated SEC orders for failing to 
address mitigating factors advanced by the individual to reduce the 
sanction.169 Courts are especially concerned where the SEC has upheld a 
permanent bar, since it amounts to termination of a professional career.170 
Courts often identify lack of remorse by the violator and substantial 
losses to investors, particularly unsophisticated customers, as important 
factors in upholding bars.171 Instances where a bar was upheld because of 
findings of egregious conduct include: 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Id. at 1140.  
 163. Id. (noting that these are the factors deemed relevant to the issuance of an injunction).  
 164. McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 165. Id.  
 166. E.g., D’Alessio v. SEC, 380 F.3d 112, 124 (2d Cir. 2004).  
 167. McCarthy, 406 F.3d at 189 (finding it suggestive that the SEC did not devote individual 
attention to the unique facts and circumstances of the case).  
 168. Id. at 188; Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 169. Saad v. SEC, 718 F.3d 904, 914 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 170. Id. at 906 (quoting PAZ Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 494 F.3d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) 
(describing a lifetime bar as “‘the securities industry equivalent of capital punishment’”); see also 
Blinder, 837 F.2d at 1113 (“Faced with a task of such gravity, the Commission must craft with 
care.”). Courts have rejected, however, arguments that the SEC can impose a permanent bar only 
if it makes findings explaining why a lesser sanction is not sufficient. Paz Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 566 
F.3d 1172, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Rizek v. SEC, 215 F.3d 157, 161 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 171. Failure to express remorse may be more common in cases where the brokers are not 
represented by counsel, as is frequently the case in disciplinary proceedings.  
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• Broker showed no remorse, customers were unsophisticated, and 
losses were substantial;172 
• Broker did not acknowledge wrong, blamed others (including 
customer), and engaged in ongoing deception;173 and 
• Broker engaged in a pattern of wrongdoing and harm to retail 
customers.174 
 
In contrast, examples of impermissible, “draconian” penalties include: 
 
• An uncertain regulatory environment;175 
• Non-frivolous claim of “systemic pattern of disparate treatment” 
against newer, smaller firms that resulted in “predictably, 
disproportionately harsh sanctions;”176 and 
• Individual has been engaged in the industry without further trouble 
since the misconduct.177 
B. THE PRACTICE OF FINRA’S SANCTIONS 
In the preceding section, we looked at the theory and law of FINRA’s 
sanctions as developed in the case law. In this section, we look at the 
practice of FINRA’s sanctions. 
First and foremost, FINRA articulates as a fundamental principle that 
its sanctions are remedial.178 Thus, for example, statements by FINRA CEO 
Richard G. Ketchum consistently emphasize that a strong enforcement 
program is for the protection of investors and do not speak in terms of 
punishing violators.179 Similarly, a former NYSE regulator (prior to the 
                                                                                                                 
 172. Rizek, 215 F.3d at 159–60 (churning in accounts of five customers). 
 173. Otto v. SEC, 253 F.3d 960, 962 (7th Cir. 2001) (misuse of a customer’s funds for his 
personal use). 
 174. Gonchar v. SEC, 409 Fed. App’x 396, 399 (2d Cir. 2010) (excessive undisclosed markups 
to retail customers). 
 175. Blinder, 837 F.2d at 1112 (antifraud and antimanipulation violations in underwriting penny 
stock offerings); Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 1976) (payment of give-
ups); see also Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1996) (vacating an SEC order because of 
insufficient notice that the SEC considered the firm’s practice a violation of its customer 
protection rule). 
 176. Blinder, 837 F.2d at 1112.  
 177. McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (floor trading violations); Beck v. 
SEC, 430 F.2d 673, 674 (6th Cir. 1970) (misrepresentations to customers in connection with sales 
of a security). 
 178. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES 4 (2011) [hereinafter FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES], 
available at http://www.finra.org/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName 
=p011038. 
 179. See, e.g., News Release, FINRA, 2012: FINRA Year in Review (Jan. 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2013/P197624 (“Protecting investors and helping 
to ensure the integrity of the nation’s financial markets is at the heart of what we do every day.”); 
see also Letter from Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & CEO, FINRA, in FINRA, FINRA 2010 
YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 2–3 (2011), available at 
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consolidation) stated that “[t]he Exchange does not frame its regulatory 
proceedings in terms of punishment.”180 FINRA’s Sanction Guidelines (the 
Guidelines) also emphasize the remedial purpose of sanctions, as is 
discussed shortly.181 
Second, it is important to keep in mind that very few of FINRA’s 
sanctions are imposed after a disciplinary hearing; consequently, the 
number of sanctions that are reviewed even by the NAC is small. This is 
true even with respect to the most severe sanctions. A review of the 
monthly FINRA disciplinary actions for 2008 showed a total of 274 
disciplinary actions imposing bars, of which over two-thirds were settled.182 
Another twenty-five percent were default decisions.183 Only in sixteen 
reported disciplinary actions imposing a bar was a hearing conducted in 
which respondents contested the charges, and in many of them respondents 
appeared pro se.184 There were another thirteen reported actions imposing a 
two-year suspension, only two of which involved hearings where 
respondents contested the charges.185 Of the eighteen reported decisions, the 
highest ultimate adjudicator in each instance was as follows: one was a 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.finra.org/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=P123836; Letter 
from Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & CEO, FINRA (2010), available at 
http://www.finra.org/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=P121646. 
 180. Susan Merrill et al., Sharper and Brighter: Focusing on Sanctions at the New York Stock 
Exchange, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 155, 169 (2006). 
 181. See infra notes 198–205 and accompanying text; see also FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, 
supra note 178, at 4. 
 182. FINRA’s 2008 disciplinary actions are reported on its website. 2008 Monthly & Quarterly 
Disciplinary Actions, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/DisciplinaryActions 
/MonthlyActions/2008/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).  
 183. See id.  
 184. See id.  
 185. Four were concluded by Letters of Acceptance, Waiver, or Consent; seven were concluded 
by Offers of Settlement. 
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judicial decision,186 seven were SEC decisions,187 four were NAC 
decisions,188 and six were hearing panel decisions.189 
Failure to contest the charges or to retain legal representation is not 
surprising since a firm is likely to terminate the employment of an 
associated person who is charged with a serious violation, and that 
individual is not likely to have a bright future in the industry unless he is a 
very successful salesperson. A recent empirical study, however, shows that 
respondents who proceed to a hearing frequently persuade the hearing panel 
to impose lower sanctions than the staff offered in settlement.190 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Gonchar v. SEC, 409 Fed. App’x 396, 400–01 (2d Cir. 2010) (denying petition for review 
of SEC order sustaining sanctions imposed by the NASD for petitioner’s violations of the 
Exchange Act). 
 187.  CMG Inst. Trading, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 59,325, 2009 WL 223617, at *11 
(Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter CMG Release] (sustaining findings of violations and sanctions); 
Epstein, Exchange Act Release No. 59,328, 2009 WL 223611, at *21 (Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter 
Epstein Release] (sustaining findings of violations and sanctions); Ortiz, Exchange Act Release 
No. 58,416, 2008 WL 3891311, at *10 (Aug. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Ortiz Release] (sustaining 
findings of violations and sanctions); Craig, Exchange Act Release No. 59,137, 2008 WL 
5328784, at *8 (Dec. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Craig Release] (sustaining findings of violations and 
sanctions); Pellegrino, Exchange Act Release 59,125, 2008 WL 5328765, at *18 (Dec. 19, 2008) 
[hereinafter Pellegrino Release] (sustaining findings of violations and sanctions); Audifferen, 
Exchange Act Release No. 58,230, 2008 WL 2876502, at *16 (July 25, 2008) [hereinafter 
Audifferen Release] (sustaining findings of violations and sanctions); Fawcett, Exchange Act 
Release No. 56,770, 2007 WL 3306105, at *8 (Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Fawcett Release] 
(sustaining findings of violations and sanctions). 
 188. Dep’t of Enforcement v. Zaragoza, Complaint No. E8A2002109804, 2008 WL 3915716, 
(FINRA NAC Aug. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Zaragoza Complaint] (affirming findings and 
sanctions); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Dunbar, Complaint No. C07050050, 2008 WL 2167905, 
(FINRA NAC May 20, 2008) [hereinafter Dunbar Complaint] (affirming findings and modifying 
sanctions); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Nicolas, Complaint No. CAF040052, 2008 WL 696458, 
(FINRA NAC Mar. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Nicolas Complaint] (affirming in part findings and 
affirming sanctions); Dep’t of Enforcement v. Paratore, Complaint No. 2005002570601, 2008 WL 
696457, (FINRA NAC Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Paratore Complaint] (modifying findings in part 
and affirming sanctions). 
 189. Dep’t of Enforcement v. Hodge, Discip. Proceeding No. 2006003995001, 2008 FINRA 
Discip. LEXIS 52 (FINRA OHO Oct. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Hodge Discip. Proceeding]; Dep’t of 
Enforcement v. Varone, Discip. Proceeding No. 2006007101701, 2008 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 55 
(FINRA OHO Aug. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Varone Discip. Proceeding]; Dep’t of Enforcement v. 
Selewach, Discip. Proceeding No. 2006005005301, 2008 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 5 (FINRA OHO 
Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Selewach Discip. Proceeding]; Dep’t of Enforcement v. Hansen, 
Discip. Proceeding No. 2005001085001, 2008 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 2 (FINRA OHO Jan. 10, 
2008) [hereinafter Hansen Discip. Proceeding]; Dep’t of Enforcement v. Mattes, Discip. 
Proceeding No. 2006005936701, 2007 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 9 (FINRA OHO Nov. 6, 2007) 
[hereinafter Mattes Discip. Proceeding]; Dep’t of Enforcement v. Behany, Discip. Proceeding No. 
E9B2003026301, 2007 NASD Discip. LEXIS 17 (NASD OHO Mar. 20, 2007) [hereinafter 
Behany Discip. Proceeding]. 
 190. Brian L. Rubin & Jae C. Yoon, Stepping into the Ring Against the SEC and FINRA: 
Sometimes It Pays to Duke It Out Against the Regulators, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 485 (2012). During 
the time period, when FINRA staff sought an industry bar, “75% of [respondents] convinced a 
Hearing Panel to impose a lesser sanction.” Id. at 489. FINRA respondents with a lawyer also 
fared significantly better than pro se respondents; during the time period, pro se respondents were 
uniformly unsuccessful. Id. at 494 n.16. 
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Because few disciplinary sanctions are imposed after a formal hearing 
and fewer still are subject to any level of appeal, there is only a small body 
of NAC decisions analyzing the factors to take into account in determining 
appropriate sanctions, hence the importance of FINRA’s Sanction 
Guidelines, which the NAC developed for use by hearing panels and the 
NAC to determine appropriate sanctions and to promote consistency and 
uniformity.191 Consistent with the “facts and circumstances” approach 
generally followed,192 the Guidelines do not prescribe fixed sanctions for 
particular violations, but instead are intended “to provide direction for 
Adjudicators in imposing sanctions consistently and fairly,”193 and 
adjudicators have discretion to impose sanctions that fall outside the 
recommended ranges.194 The Guidelines set forth aggravating and 
mitigating factors for adjudicators to take into account and permit 
adjudicators to consider other aggravating and mitigating factors as well.195 
The value of the Guidelines is that they focus the attention of the 
adjudicators on relevant considerations, and to the extent the factors focus 
on remediation, the Guidelines may act as a curb on the natural tendency to 
punish wrongdoers. Courts have cited with approval the SEC’s references 
to the Guidelines in its consideration of appropriate sanctions.196 Indeed, the 
D.C. Circuit recently vacated an SEC order affirming a NASD permanent 
                                                                                                                 
 191. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 1. NASD first published the Sanction 
Guidelines in 1993, and they are regularly revised. March 2006 Revisions, supra note 12 (answer 
to question 1). The NAC “possesses ultimate authority with respect to the Sanction Guidelines.” 
Id. 
 192. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 1, 3, 4. FINRA, however, has 
established a bar as the standard sanction for three violations: failure to respond to a FINRA 
inquiry or investigation, conversion of a customer’s funds or securities, and cheating on 
qualifications examinations. See infra notes 206, 208 and accompanying text. 
 193. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 1. By contrast, the Exchange Act 
authorizes the SEC to impose a civil penalty if the agency finds that it is in the public interest and 
that the person has committed a willful offense or failed reasonably to supervise another person. 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b) (2012). The statute then sets forth a three-tier structure for determining 
monetary penalties in SEC administrative proceedings and federal district court proceedings 
brought by the SEC. Id. § 78u(d)(3). The third tier provides for the maximum amount of penalties 
and thus identifies the most serious types of offenses. To impose third-tier penalties, the 
adjudicator must find that the violation involved at least reckless disregard of a regulatory 
requirement and resulted in substantial losses, or created a significant risk of substantial losses, to 
other persons or resulted in substantial pecuniary gain to the violator. Id. §§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii), 78u-
2(b)(3). If adopted by FINRA, these factors could provide more concrete guidance as to what 
constitutes “egregious” conduct. The statute also sets forth a non-exclusive list of factors the SEC 
may consider in deciding whether a penalty is in the public interest: whether the violation 
involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of regulatory 
requirements; the harm to other persons resulting from the violation; the extent to which any 
person was unjustly enriched, taking into account any restitution made to the injured persons; 
whether the person is a recidivist; and the need to deter such person and other persons. Id. § 78u-
2(c). 
 194. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 1.  
 195. Id.  
 196. Stoiber v. SEC, 161 F.3d 745, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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bar because it failed to address all of the mitigating factors raised by the 
associated person, including, in particular, a factor expressly identified in 
the Guidelines as mitigating.197 
The Guidelines contain general principles that should be considered in 
all cases as well as specific considerations for common violations (the 
General Principles). Beginning with the First Principle, the Sanction 
Guidelines convey a message that FINRA sanctions are “remedial”: 
Disciplinary sanctions are remedial in nature and should be designed 
to deter future misconduct and to improve overall business standards 
in the securities industry. The overall purposes of FINRA’s disciplinary 
process and FINRA’s responsibility in imposing sanctions are to 
remediate misconduct by preventing the recurrence of misconduct, 
improving overall standards in the industry, and protecting the investing 
public. Toward this end, Adjudicators should design sanctions that are 
significant enough to prevent and discourage future misconduct by a 
respondent, to deter others from engaging in similar misconduct, and to 
modify and improve business practices.198 
Similarly, other statements in the General Principles set forth purposes 
that courts have recognized as appropriately remedial.199 Thus, adjudicators 
are encouraged to design sanctions to prevent the recurrence of 
misconduct.200 In order to remediate misconduct, adjudicators should order 
restitution and/or rescission201 and should take into account a respondent’s 
ill-gotten gain in determining fines.202 Requiring a violator to requalify in 
any or all capacities is an appropriate sanction when adjudicators have 
found that his actions demonstrated a lack of knowledge or familiarity with 
the rules of the securities industry.203 
The literature on sanctions recognizes that regulators may appropriately 
impose sanctions to induce compliance with the rules and to deter 
misconduct by raising the cost of violation above the cost of compliance.204 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Saad v. SEC, 718 F.3d 904, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also PAZ Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 494 
F.3d 1059, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that the SEC must carefully consider potentially 
mitigating factors, especially when the associated person faces a lifetime bar). 
 198. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 2 (General Principle 1).  
 199. Id. at 4.  
 200. Id. at 3 (General Principle 3). Examples include requiring a consultant to design or 
implement compliance procedures and requiring a firm to implement heightened supervision of 
certain individuals or departments. Id. 
 201. Id. at 4 (General Principle 5). Adjudicators may order restitution when an identifiable 
person “has suffered a quantifiable loss proximately caused by respondent’s misconduct.” Id. 
Without causation, however, a restitution sanction is arbitrary and non-remedial. See Siegel v. 
SEC, 592 F.3d 147, 161–62 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 202. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 5 (General Principle 6).  
 203. Id. at 5 (General Principle 7).  
 204. The classic economic analysis of this is Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). For a recent discussion of its application to 
securities offenses, see Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public 
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Under this approach, an important factor for the regulator to take into 
account in determining sanctions is the difficulty in detecting violations.205 
This factor, however, is not mentioned as a consideration in the Sanction 
Guidelines and is not discussed in the opinions, perhaps because FINRA 
does not want to suggest that some violations are difficult to detect. 
FINRA explains that, in determining if a violation is egregious, 
adjudicators “assess the individual facts and circumstances of the case” and 
“also consider all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.”206 FINRA 
does not attempt to define “egregious,” but the dictionary definition of 
“[e]xtremely or remarkably bad” provides a working definition consistent 
with the Sanction Guidelines.207 Thus, the Sanction Guidelines identify 
factors that can lead to a finding of egregious conduct: repeated instances of 
wrongful conduct;208 the violator’s motives, e.g., bad faith209 and intentional 
misconduct;210 significant injury to customers211 and activity involving 
numerous customers;212 and failures to meet compliance requirements for 
extended periods of time.213 The Sanction Guidelines frequently refer to 
factors that go to mens rea, scienter, and prior disciplinary history.214 Thus, 
the General Principles state that “sanctions should be more severe for 
recidivists.”215 Similarly, the Guidelines identify a number of factors that 
may be mitigating or aggravating, as the case may be,216 many of which 
also go to mens rea, including repentance (especially prior to detection),217 
lack of remorse and concealment,218 and intent/culpability.219 Although the 
emphasis on mens rea suggests an intention to punish, these factors can also 
be described as remedial since they address the need to protect the general 
                                                                                                                 
Enforcement of Law, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2230396 (describing the deterrent effect of sanctions). 
 205. See Minzner, supra note 136, at 877–78 (citing the literature). 
 206. March 2006 Revisions, supra note 12 (answer to question 17). The website explains that 
adjudicators have “wide discretion” in determining sanctions. Id. (answer to question 7). 
 207. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 593 (9th ed. 2009). In the case law under Rule 10b-5, 
“egregious” conduct generally connotes at least reckless conduct. See, e.g., In re Livent, Inc. 
Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F. Supp. 2d 371, 418–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing pleading 
standard under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act). 
 208. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 98 n.2 (categories of egregious 
unauthorized trading); id. at 13 (outside activities including selling away); id. at 39 (failure to 
register).  
 209. Id. at 98 n.2 (egregious unauthorized trading).  
 210. Id. at 41 (failure to comply with continuing education requirements).  
 211. Id. at 13 (outside activities including selling away).  
 212. Id. at 82 (failure to comply with risk disclosure requirements for day trading accounts).  
 213. Id. at 64 (failure to comply with TRACE reporting requirements).  
 214. See id. at 4–6. 
 215. Id. at 2.  
 216. Id. at 6–7.  
 217. Id. at 2–4.  
 218. See id. at 6.  
 219. See id. at 4, 7. 
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investing public from an individual who has shown himself to be a “bad 
apple.” 
By contrast, the Exchange Act provides somewhat more guidance for 
the imposition of civil penalties in SEC actions. The statute authorizes the 
SEC to impose a civil penalty if the agency finds that it is in the public 
interest and that the person has committed a willful offense or failed 
reasonably to supervise another person.220 The statute then sets forth a 
three-tier structure for determining monetary penalties in SEC 
administrative proceedings221 and in federal district court proceedings 
brought by the SEC.222 The third tier provides for the maximum amount of 
penalties and thus identifies the most serious types of offenses. To impose 
third-tier penalties, the adjudicator must find that the violation involved at 
least reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement and resulted in 
substantial losses, or created a significant risk of substantial losses, to other 
persons or resulted in substantial pecuniary gain to the violator.223 If 
adopted by FINRA, these factors could provide more concrete guidance as 
to what constitutes “egregious” conduct. The statute also sets forth a non-
exclusive list of factors the SEC may consider in deciding whether a 
penalty is in the public interest: whether the violation involved fraud, 
deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of regulatory 
requirements; the harm to other persons resulting from the violation; the 
extent to which any person was unjustly enriched, taking into account any 
restitution made to the injured persons; whether the person is a recidivist; 
and the need to deter such person and other persons.224 These factors are 
similar to those identified in the Sanction Guidelines. 
Two other factors set forth in the Sanction Guidelines are also worthy 
of mention. Firm size and the ability to pay are considerations that do not 
seem relevant in assessing whether sanctions are appropriately remedial. 
Congress, however, identified the violator’s ability to pay a civil penalty as 
an important consideration when in 1990 it authorized, for the first time, the 
SEC to impose monetary penalties,225 and the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 requires federal agencies to establish a 
policy to provide for the reduction or waiver of civil penalties for small 
entities.226 In 1996, the SEC vacated a NASD restitution order because its 
refusal to consider evidence of financial inability to pay was unduly 
                                                                                                                 
 220. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b) (2012). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. § 78u(d)(3). 
 223. Id. §§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii), 78u-2(b)(3). 
 224. Id. § 78u-2(c).  
 225. Id. § 78u-2(d); see also Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104. Stat. 931; SECURITIES LAW ENFORCEMENT REMEDIES ACT OF 
1990, H.R. REP. NO. 101-616, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1388.  
 226. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 223, 110 
Stat. 857, 862. 
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harsh.227 As a result of these directives from Congress and the SEC, the 
Guidelines instruct adjudicators to consider firm size to ensure that the 
sanctions are “not punitive but are sufficiently remedial to achieve 
deterrence.”228 The Guidelines also explicitly state that the SEC requires 
adjudicators to consider ability to pay in connection with the imposition, 
reduction, or waiver of a fine or restitution when the respondent raises the 
issue.229 The Guidelines, while stating generally that adjudicators should 
consider firm size, also draw a distinction between sanctions imposed for 
violations based on negligent conduct and those based on fraudulent, 
willful, or reckless conduct. In the latter instances, adjudicators are 
permitted not to take into account firm size.230 
A second important factor that does relate to a remedial purpose is 
compliance. The Guidelines emphasize the importance of compliance. 
Thus, adjudicators may appropriately consider: 
 
• “Whether, at the time of the violation, the . . . firm had developed 
reasonable supervisory, operational and/or technical procedures or 
controls that were properly implemented;”231 
• “Whether, at the time of the violation, the firm had developed 
adequate training and educational initiatives;”232 
• “Whether the respondent demonstrated reasonable reliance on 
competent legal or accounting advice;”233 and 
• Whether the firm can demonstrate that the conduct was “not 
otherwise reflective of the firm’s historical compliance record.”234 
 
Because regulatory standards require compliance systems for investor 
protection and because compliance systems are expensive, these factors 
identify important remedial purposes. 
Finally, despite FINRA’s emphasis on the facts and circumstances of 
the inquiry, there are three violations where a bar is standard. These are: 
 
• Individuals who fail to respond in any manner to FINRA inquiry or 
investigation.235 Because FINRA does not have subpoena power, 
this is a violation of the fundamental nature of self-regulation; lack 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Reed, Exchange Act Release No. 37,572, 1996 WL 466575, at *2 (Aug. 14, 1996). 
 228. FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES, supra note 178, at 2. General Principle 8 requires 
adjudicators to consider ability to pay when raised by a respondent. Id. at 5.  
 229. Id. at 5.  
 230. Id. at 2 n.2.  
 231. Id. at 6.  
 232. Id.  
 233. Id.  
 234. Id. at 7.  
 235. See id. at 33. Where mitigation exists, suspension in any or all capacities for up to two 
years is suggested.  
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of harm to customers or benefit to the violator does not mitigate this 
violation. 236 
• Conversion of a customer’s funds or securities, regardless of 
amount converted.237 More than any other violation, this offense 
damages the public’s confidence in the broker-dealer relationship. 
• Cheating on qualifications exams.238 An individual who gained 
entry through cheating should not be allowed to continue in the 
industry. 
 
As described earlier, a review of the FINRA 2008 Monthly and 
Quarterly Disciplinary Actions found eighteen decisions where a bar or a 
two-year suspension was imposed. 239 Many of the violations that resulted 
in a bar were those for which a bar is standard. Thus, five of eighteen 
decisions imposed a bar on an individual for failure to respond to a FINRA 
inquiry or investigation;240 another three imposed a bar for conversion of 
customers’ funds.241 Bars or a two-year suspension were also imposed for 
other forms of simple fraud or obvious wrongdoing, such as failure to 
disclose one’s criminal record on the Form U-4,242 forgery,243 misuse of 
customer’s funds,244 excessive trading in a customer’s account,245 trading 
ahead of a customer,246 or interpositioning.247 Many decisions note as 
aggravating factors the willful or intentional nature of the conduct,248 the 
failure to acknowledge responsibility for wrongdoing,249 substantial harm to 
customers,250 and taking advantage of vulnerable customers.251 Youth and 
inexperience were not accepted as mitigating factors.252 Dishonest conduct 
                                                                                                                 
 236. Id. at 2 n.2.  
 237. Id. at 36.  
 238. Id. at 40.  
 239. See supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text. 
 240. Ortiz Release, supra note 187; Fawcett Release, supra note 187; Hodge Discip. 
Proceeding, supra note 189; Varone Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189; Hansen Discip. 
Proceeding, supra note 189. In one administrative proceeding, a NASD member firm and its CEO 
received two-year suspensions for failure to respond in a timely fashion. CMG Release, supra 
note 187. 
 241. Paratore Complaint, supra note 188; Selewach Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189; Mattes 
Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189.  
 242. Craig Release, supra note 187. 
 243. Ortiz Release, supra note 187. 
 244. Varone Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189. 
 245. Zaragoza Complaint, supra note 188.  
 246. Nicolas Complaint, supra note 188. 
 247. Gonchar v. SEC, 409 Fed. App’x 396, 399 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 248. Ortiz Release, supra note 187; Audifferen Release, supra note 187. 
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 252. Epstein Release, supra note 187, at *21. 
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was not excused because it was done for the purpose of benefitting the 
customer.253 
CONCLUSION 
Part I documents the transformation of the securities SRO from a 
membership organization with contractual powers to require its members to 
adhere to aspirational standards to a professional regulator that derives its 
powers from the Exchange Act. Part II explores the tenuous distinction 
between remedial and punitive sanctions and describes FINRA’s current 
system for disciplining its members and associated persons. This is a 
system that, to date, has operated largely under the radar without much 
academic scrutiny. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 253. Behany Discip. Proceeding, supra note 189 (improperly obtaining CDSC waivers for 
customers; two brokers who accepted responsibility received two-year suspensions). 
